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Court of Justice of the European Union (K. Jürimäe, President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, N. Piçarra, N. Jääskinen (Rapporteur) and M. Gavalec, Judges) Case C‑590/22 AT and another v PS GbR and others ECLI:EU: C:2024:536, [2024] EUECJ C-590/22, EU: C:2024:536
This was a request by the Wesel Amtsgericht for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of art 82 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1) (‘the GDPR’) pursuant to art 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The request was made in proceedings between AT and BT against PS Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts ("PS GbR") and its members for compensation for the disclosure of their personal data to third parties without their consent as a result of an error by the firm.
The Proceedings
PS GbR was a tax consultancy, and AT and BT were two of its clients. AT and BT instructed PS GbR to draw up their tax return. The consultancy carried out their instructions but sent the return to AT and BT's previous address. AT and BT recovered the envelope that had contained the tax return but found that it contained only a covering letter and a copy of the return. The missing documents contained the names, dates of birth, tax identification numbers, religious denominations, bank details, professions, places of work and disability status of AT and BT, as well as their children's personal data. AT and BT sued PS GbR and its members for €15,000 compensation in the Wesel Amtsgericht, the lowest civil court in the German legal system.
The Reference
The court decided that it could not decide the claim without referring the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union:
"(1) Is it sufficient for the establishment of a claim for compensation under Article 82 (1) of [the GDPR] that a provision of [that regulation] serving to protect the claimant has been infringed or is it necessary that a further adverse effect on the claimant has occurred, beyond the infringement of the provision as such?
(2) Under EU law, does the establishment of a claim for compensation for non-material damage under Article 82 (1) of the GDPR require an adverse effect of a certain magnitude?
(3) In particular, is it sufficient for the establishment of a claim for compensation for non-material damage under Article 82(1) of the GDPR that the claimant fears that his or her personal data have come into the hands of third parties as a result of infringements of provisions of the GDPR, even though that circumstance cannot be positively established?
(4) Is it in conformity with EU law for the national court to apply mutatis mutandis the criteria of the second sentence of Article 83 (2) of the GDPR - which, according to the wording, apply only to administrative fines - when assessing compensation for non-material damage under Article 82 (1) of the GDPR?
(5) Must the amount of a claim for compensation for non-material damage under Article 82 (1) of the GDPR also be assessed by reference to the fact that the amount of the claim awarded serves to have a deterrent effect and/or to prevent the “commercialisation” (calculated acceptance of administrative fines/compensation payments) of infringements?
(6) Is it in conformity with EU law, when assessing the amount of a claim for compensation for non-material damage under Article 82(1) of the GDPR, to take into account simultaneous infringements of national provisions which have as their purpose the protection of personal data but which are not delegated or implementing acts adopted in accordance with that regulation or Member State laws [specifying rules] of that regulation?’
Legislative Context
The CJEU considered recitals (85), (146) and (148) and arts 4 (1), (7), (10) and (12), 79 (1) and 83 (3) and (5) of the GDPR as well as the following paragraphs of art 82:
"1. Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.
2. Any controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused by processing which infringes this Regulation. A processor shall be liable for the damage caused by processing only where it has not complied with obligations of this Regulation specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.
3. A controller or processor shall be exempt from liability under paragraph 2 if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.
......."
Judgment
The CJEU delivered judgment on 20 June 2024 (Case C‑590/22 AT and another v PS GbR and others ECLI:EU: C:2024:536, [2024] EUECJ C-590/22, EU: C:2024:536).
The First and Second Questions
The Court took the 1st and 2nd questions together. In its view, the Amstgericht was asking whether art 82 (1) should be interpreted as meaning that the mere infringement of the GDPR would be sufficient to give rise to compensation or whether a claimant had also to show that the infringement had led to damage of a sufficient degree of seriousness.
The CJEU has already held in para [32] of Case C‑300/2 UI v Österreichische Post AG [2023] WLR(D) 221, EU: C:2023:370, [2023] EUECJ C-300/21, ECLI: EU: C:2023:370 and para [34] of Case C‑741/21, GP v juris GmbH [2024] EUECJ C-741/21, ECLI: EU: C:2024:288, EU: C:2024:288 that it is clear from the wording of the article that the existence of ‘damage, whether material or non-material, constitutes one of the conditions for compensation under art 82 (1). So, too, does the existence of an infringement and of a causal link between that damage and the infringement. The three conditions are cumulative.
It follows that it cannot be held that any ‘infringement’ of the provisions of the GDPR, by itself, confers a right to compensation. The answer to question 1 is that art 82 (1) of the GDPR must be interpreted as meaning that the mere infringement of the provisions of that regulation is not sufficient to confer a right to compensation."1. Article 82 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), must be interpreted as meaning that an infringement of that regulation is not, in itself, sufficient to give rise to a right to compensation under that provision. The data subject must also establish the existence of damage caused by that infringement, without, however, that damage having to reach a certain degree of seriousness.
2. Article 82 (1) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that a person’s fear that his or her personal data have, as a result of an infringement of that regulation, been disclosed to third parties, without it being possible to establish that that was in fact the case, is sufficient to give rise to a right to compensation, provided that that fear, with its negative consequences, is duly proven.
3. Article 82 (1) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine the amount of damages due as compensation for damage based on that provision, it is not necessary, first, to apply mutatis mutandis the criteria for setting the amount of administrative fines laid down in Article 83 of that regulation and, second, to confer on that right to compensation a dissuasive function.
4. Article 82 (1) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine the amount of damages due as compensation for damage based on that provision, it is not necessary to take account of simultaneous infringements of national provisions which relate to the protection of personal data but which are not intended to specify the rules of that regulation."
Comment
As this ruling was delivered after IP completion day, courts in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are not bound by it or the principles contained in this judgment. However, s.6 (2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended, permits courts in those jurisdictions to have regard to it insofar as it is relevant to any matter before them. This judgment will therefore be cited and considered in cases on the meaning and effect of art 82 of the UK GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (United Kingdom General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance)).
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